UNBIASED AND INDEPENDENT NATURE OF INEC IN NIGERIAN POLITICS: MYTH OR REALITY?

By Dr. Michael Akam Abang

1. Introduction

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), remains a central institution in Nigeria’s democratic architecture. Constitutionally mandated to conduct and supervise elections, INEC is expected to operate as a neutral and impartial body, free from executive control or partisan influence. Its credibility forms the bedrock upon which public confidence in Nigeria’s democracy rests.

However, public discourse around INEC’s neutrality has intensified following President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s nomination of Professor Joash Ojo Amupitan, SAN, as the new Chairman of INEC in October 2025. The controversy initially stemmed from widespread but inaccurate claims that Prof. Amupitan had been part of President Tinubu’s 2023 Presidential Election Petition Tribunal legal team.

Subsequent fact-checks and official clarifications, however, have shown that these claims were false. Babatunde Ogala, SAN, who coordinated Tinubu’s 2023 legal team, publicly confirmed that Prof. Amupitan was not a member of that team. Court records from the Presidential Election Petition Court (PEPC) and the Supreme Court also contained no mention of his participation.

While this clarification restores the factual record, the episode raises deeper questions about the public perception of INEC’s independence and the need to safeguard its institutional integrity beyond mere legality.

2. The Constitutional and Statutory Foundation of INEC’s Independence

INEC’s independence is constitutionally guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and further protected by the Electoral Act, 2022.

2.1 Establishment and Functions

Under Section 153(1)(f) of the Constitution, INEC is established as one of the Federal Executive Bodies. Its functions are detailed in Paragraph 15, Part I, Third Schedule, which mandates the Commission to:

“Organize, undertake, and supervise all elections to the offices of the President and Vice President, the Governor and Deputy Governor of a State, and to the membership of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the House of Assembly of each State of the Federation.”

2.2 Autonomy in Operation

The Constitution ensures INEC’s autonomy through Section 158(1), which provides that:

“In exercising its powers to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons, the Independent National Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person.”

In addition, Section 3(1) of the Electoral Act, 2022 guarantees financial independence by stating:

“The funds for the Commission shall be a first charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation.”

These provisions establish INEC as an independent and self-regulating body — at least in theory.

3. The Paradox of Presidential Appointment

Despite its constitutional safeguards, INEC’s independence is complicated by the presidential power of appointment. According to Section 154(1) of the Constitution, the President appoints the INEC Chairman and National Commissioners, subject to Senate confirmation.

This system introduces a structural paradox: the executive branch, which has a vested interest in electoral outcomes, appoints the head of the institution responsible for regulating those same elections. This reality often breeds skepticism among the public — especially when nominees are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as having partisan ties.

4. The Amupitan Nomination: Facts, Perceptions, and Public Trust

The nomination of Prof. Joash Amupitan, SAN reignited debate on INEC’s impartiality, not because of proven partisanship, but due to public perception and misinformation.

When news first circulated that he had been part of President Tinubu’s 2023 legal defense team, critics quickly raised concerns about potential bias and conflict of interest. However, fact-checks by reputable outlets, including ThisDay, The Nation, and Tell Magazine, as well as statements by Babatunde Ogala, SAN, categorically disproved these claims.

Ogala clarified that Prof. Amupitan was not involved in Tinubu’s legal defense and his name did not appear on any of the certified court documents filed before the Presidential Election Petition Tribunal or the Supreme Court.

Nevertheless, the rapid spread of the initial misinformation underscores a critical democratic challenge: perception of bias can erode trust, even where none exists. In matters of electoral integrity, appearance and reality are equally significant. INEC’s leadership must therefore be perceived as unquestionably impartial, not merely constitutionally independent.

5. Judicial Perspectives on INEC’s Independence

The Nigerian judiciary has repeatedly emphasized that INEC must remain independent, both in law and in practice.

INEC v. Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 806) 72 (SC)
The Supreme Court affirmed that INEC is constitutionally independent and not subject to any external control in the performance of its duties.

Attorney-General of the Federation v. Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1 (SC)
The Court reaffirmed that commissions created under Section 153, including INEC, must act autonomously.

PDP v. INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1437) 525 (CA)
The Court of Appeal observed that while INEC’s independence is guaranteed by law, its functional independence often depends on political will and institutional integrity.

Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1 (SC)
The Court warned that a credible electoral system is indispensable to the legitimacy of democratic governance.

Faleke v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1543) 61 (CA)
The Court emphasized that INEC must be “a neutral umpire” committed to transparency and fairness.

These rulings collectively reinforce that INEC’s independence is not optional — it is a constitutional command and a democratic necessity.

6. Philosophical and Ethical Perspectives*l

From a philosophical viewpoint, INEC’s independence reflects a deeper moral obligation. John Locke’s theory of consent holds that legitimate government arises only from the will of the people — a will expressed through credible elections.

Montesquieu’s principle of separation of powers also underscores that no branch of government should unduly influence another. INEC’s role as an impartial electoral umpire aligns with this principle, ensuring that transitions of power are governed by law, not political expediency.

Furthermore, Aristotle’s concept of justice demands that fairness must not only be done but also be seen to be done. Thus, INEC’s neutrality must be both factual and visible to all stakeholders.

7. The Rule Against Bias and Its Democratic Significance

In Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577, Lord Denning held that:

> “Justice must be rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking that the judge was biased.”

This principle extends to all administrative bodies, including INEC. Paragraph 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Nigerian Constitution (Code of Conduct for Public Officers) also forbids any situation where personal or prior relationships conflict with official duties.

While Prof. Amupitan’s case does not violate this rule — since the alleged association with the President’s legal team has been proven false — the public reaction demonstrates that maintaining public confidence requires not just constitutional compliance, but proactive transparency.

8. Implications for Nigeria’s Democracy

Even unfounded claims of bias can harm the democratic process by:

1. Undermining Public Trust — Citizens lose faith in the integrity of elections.

2. Fueling Political Tension — Suspicion and misinformation can escalate into unrest.

3. Encouraging Electoral Apathy — Distrust discourages voter participation.

4. Increasing Litigation — More disputes challenge electoral legitimacy.

INEC’s independence must therefore be both substantive and perceived, ensuring that every Nigerian believes in the integrity of their vote.

9. Toward a Truly Independent INEC

To strengthen INEC’s independence, Nigeria must adopt both institutional and procedural reforms:

1. Depoliticize Appointments: Amend the Constitution to involve the National Judicial Council (NJC), civil society, and Council of State in INEC appointments.

2. Enforce Financial Autonomy: Implement Section 3(1) of the Electoral Act to guarantee direct funding.

3. Institutional Accountability: Introduce public vetting and disclosure processes for appointees.

4. Constitutional Safeguards: Provide fixed, non-renewable terms for INEC leadership to prevent executive pressure.

10. Conclusion

The independence of INEC remains both a constitutional requirement and a democratic necessity. While the claims against Prof. Joash Amupitan, SAN were proven false, the episode exposes a lingering fragility in Nigeria’s democratic trust. Public confidence in elections cannot rest solely on legality — it must be built on transparency, neutrality, and ethical leadership.

True electoral independence will emerge only when INEC’s leadership, processes, and appointments are shielded from all forms of political suspicion. Until then, the unbiased and independent nature of INEC will remain an aspiration Nigeria must continue striving to achieve.

By Dr. Michael Akam Abang is a
Legal Practitioner/Educational Philosopher based in Nigeria.

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